Euroscepticism: respondents' image of the European Union from 2006 to 2022

Euroscepticism, the political position which opposes European integration or proposes leaving the EU, peaked in the early 2010s during the period of the Eurozone crisis. Approval of the EU had been stable at a relatively high level in the 2000s, with around half of respondents having a positive image of the union, before sharply dropping from 2010 onwards to under a third of respondents. In spite of the spike in negative attitudes towards the EU, the total share of respondents with a negative outlook never exceeded the share of those with a positive one. By 2020, disapproval of the EU was back down to below twenty percent, and has fallen further since. The share of respondents with a positive image of the bloc has risen back to pre-financial crisis levels, signifying a remarkable turnaround in the public image of the EU. Whether this reflects a secular trend, or is the result of the external shocks of Covid-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which have both forced the member states of the union to cooperate on further integration measures, is yet to be seen.

The Eurozone Crisis and the rise of euroscepticism

Euroscepticism in the 2010s was driven by a succession of crises in both the economic and political spheres, which were latched onto by populists of both the far-left and far-right. The Eurozone crisis was triggered in 2010 by financial market pressure on the heavily indebted countries on the EU's periphery who were also member of the Euro currency area (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, among others). The economies of these member states had suffered greatly during the global financial crisis and great recession, with the collapse of their housing markets and failure of their banking systems meaning that their governments had to take on increasing debt burdens. As it became clear that their debt levels were unsustainable, the yield on their government debt spiked, meaning that new borrowing became unaffordable. In most cases, the 'Troika' of the EU Commission, ECB, and IMF stepped in to provide bailouts, but with harsh austerity conditions which generated further unemployment and social discontent. The crisis was largely resolved by late 2012, as ECB chief Mario Draghi resolved to do "whatever it takes" to stabilize yields and to save the Euro. Nevertheless, Greece remained in deep trouble until after 2015, with question marks remaining about whether they would leave the Euro. Greece finally exited its Troika bailout program in 2018.

Increasing migration flows and populist discontent

While the Eurozone crisis was resolved (or at least delayed until a future date) by the middle of the decade, the populist political forces which it had unleashed began to have successes across the continent. The humanitarian crisis trigerred by the fleeing of millions of people from the war in Syria and other conflicts in the Middle East & North Africa towards Europe poured fuel on the fire of populism. Parties who opposed migration took power in Central & Eastern Europe, with Poland's Law and Justice Party and Hungary's Fidesz becoming some of the EU's biggest adversaries over the 2010s. Far-right parties in Western Europe such as the AfD in Germany, National Rally in France, Lega in Italy, PVV in the Netherlands, and Vox in Spain began to have unprecedented electoral success. These parties were buoyed by the Brexit referendum in the UK, where the populist challenger UKIP had forced the ruling Conservative Party to announce a vote on the UK's membership of the EU. With the referendum won by the 'leave' side, populist forces in other countries sought to capitalize on this momentum by entering government and, if not leaving the EU entirely, forcing changes to the way the union is run. While much ink was spilled over the threat this populist challenge posed to the EU, in many cases when populist parties entered government, such as Syriza in Greece and the Five Star Movement in Italy, they softened their tone towards leaving the union and focused rather on domestic politics than EU reform.

Covid-19, Russia-Ukraine War, and the end of euroscepticism?

By the end of the decade of the 2010s, the populist and eurosceptic wave which had swept over the continent began to recede. Voters became dissatisfied with the achievements of many populist parties once they had entered office and a series of external shocks would further dampen the hostility towards the EU. The Covid-19 Pandemic struck in early 2020, and while the EU has been criticized for not having a united response to the crisis and being slow to organize the roll-out of vaccination programs, the pandemic focused populist energies towards anti-lockdown and anti-vaccination campaigns which targeted national governments rather than the EU. The pandemic also produced a "rally around the flag" effect, whereby the public approval of establishment forces which were seeking to contain the crisis spiked, while support for populist challengers decreased. This trend was compounded by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, as the external threat of Russian aggression united many Europeans behind the EU and member state response. Notably, the crisis has driven Eastern member states such as Poland and the Baltic states into greater cooperation with the EU institutions, while some far-right populist parties, such as Marine Le Pen's National Rally, have been heavily criticized for their links to the Russian state. Whether this trend towards declining euroscepticism reflects a secular trend, or whether it is merely the result of the external shocks to the union, still remains to be seen.